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PRISONERS' RIGHTS TO MEDICAL CARE
"MARVIN ZALMAN*
INTRODUCTION

In the nineteenth century Western nations
turned to imprisonent as the standard form of
criminal punishment, replacing mutilation, corporal punishment, and banishment. Spurred by
this reformist impulse, public opinion demanded
that prisons meet some minimal levels of human
necessity, if not human decency. At the end of
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
centuries the scientific revolution reached the art
of healing. As physicians became able to systematically heal the ills of the body, access to medical
care joined the list of necessaries to be provided to
prisoners. Moreover, improved medical care has
arrived at a time marked by a fundamental shift
in attitudes towards prisoners' rights. No longer
are prisoners said to be slaves of the state and entitled only to the rights granted them by the basic
humanity and whims of their jailors. 1 Instead, it
is recognized today that the prisoner is confined
for the protection of the public, and therefore
"[lit is but just that the public be required to care
for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the
deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." 2
* B.A., 1963, Cornell U.; J. D., 1966, Brooklyn Law
School; M. A., 1971, School of Criminal Justice,
S.U.N.Y. Albany. Assistant Professor of Criminal
Justice, Michigan State University.
SSee uffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 1024, 1026, 21
Gratt. 790, 796 (1871), in which the court expresses
such an attitude toward the prisoner:
[Dluring his term of service in the penitentiary, he
is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He
has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords
to him. He is for the time being the slave of the
State.
2Spicer v. Wlliamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E.
291, 293 (1926). Because the duty of care was one owed
by the public, the court found that a sheriff or other
officer could not be held personally liable for failure to
provide medical attention. See also People ex rd.
Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d
725, 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1961) ("An individual, once validly convicted and placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction (Correction
Law, § 6), is not to be divested of all rights and unalterably abandoned and forgotten by the remainder
of society."); and Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433,
439, 227 N.E.2d 383, 386, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 (1967)
(Keating, 3. dissenting: "The right of an individual to
seek relief from illegal treatment or to complain about

This trend toward increased recognition of
prisoners' rights, including the right to medical
care, is reflected not only in the statutes3 and tort
law' of most states, but also in the recent erosion
of the "hands-off" doctrine. In its tersest legal
formulation, "the hands-off doctrine represents a
denial of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
petitions from prisoners alleging some form of mistreatment or contesting some deprivation undergone during imprisonment." 5 This lack of subject
matter jurisdiction has no statutory basis but is
instead a judge-made limitation. Underlying the
doctrine is an assessment that the deprivations
prisoners complain of are necessary conditions of
imprisonment. A more important basis for the
hands-off doctrine is a profound reluctance by the
courts to interfere with prison administration.
Part of this reluctance is the fear that judicial
interference would create a flood of litigation and
6
would destroy prison discipline.
The validity of the grounds for the hands-off
doctrine has been reconsidered and courts have
retreated from their former tendency to apply the
4octrine strictly. Although the reluctance of the
unlawful conduct does not end when the doors of a
prison dose behind him. True it is that a person sentenced to a period of confinement in a penal institution
is necessarily deprived of many personal liberties. Yet
there are certain rights [including the right to communicate to officers of the court or governmental officials] so necessary and essential to prevent the abuse of
power and illegal conduct that not even a prison sentence can annul them.")
CA. PENaL CODE § 2650 (West 1970): "The person

of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment in the State
prison is under the protection of the law, and any injury to his person, not authorized by law, is punishable
in the same manner as if he were not convicted or sentenced." N.Y. C= RiGn S LAW § 79-c (McKinney

Supp. 1971) is identical to the California provision.
3
4 See notes 11-12 infra and accompanying text.

See generally Sneidman, Prisoners and Medical
Treatment: Their Rights and Remedies, 4 CRn=. L.

Bur. 450 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sneidman, Prisoners].
5Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique
of Judicial Refisal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,

72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Beyond

the Ken].
6F.
RE mGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. XmssALL, M.
IEL. & H. GomsTn, CRmnAL JusTicE ADmwisTRATON: MATERmAS AN CASEs 826-27 (1969) [herein-

after cited as ElmGTON]; Beyond the Ken at 506-09.
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courts to interfere with internal prison matters is
no longer as strong as it once was, there are still
barriers to suits brought by prisoners. At the present time, "hands-off" is still the rule when routine
prison administrative decisions are challenged. Yet
the greater availability of certain remedies, primarily under federal habeas corpus and civil
rights statutes, means definite exceptions have
been carved from the hands-off rule
A major problem in understanding developments in this area of law is that the substantive
content of rights has remained essentially unchanged but existing remedies have been applied
to an increased number of fact situations presented
by prisoners' complaints. Expansion of remedies
has not been the result of the abrogation of explicit
jurisdictional barriers, but rather is due to an
unfolding awareness that more of the facts of
imprisonment complained of constitute justifiable
claims under available remedies. No longer is
senseless or irrational mistreatment regarded as a
natural condition of imprisonment. The recognition that fewer privations are necessarily the
prisoner's lot has been accompanied by a gradual
discrediting of the rationales supporting the hands
off doctrine. For example, the argument that
courts will be flooded by prisoners' suits has been
rejected when the claim is made that a protected
constitutional right has been seriously infringed 8
Also, it is now argued that statutes which create
departments of corrections within the executive
branch of government should not be regarded as
precluding judicial review of administrative decisions by corrections officials. 9 In administrative
law terms, the recent erosion of the hands-off
doctrine represents a belated move away from the
nineteenth century position of unreviewability to
a sounder position of "presumption of reviewability." 10Just how far the courts have gone will be
seen in the examination of cases later in this paper.
This article will examine the law of prisoners'
REMINGTON at 826-51; TEE P

SREsmENT's Come-

MISSION ON LAW EN-ORCEMENT AND ADi3m/STRATION

OF JusncE, TASK FoRcE REPORT: CORRECTioNs 82-88
(1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRcE: CoRREcTIoNs].
8
See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 41011 (1971), dismissing the argument that, because of
limits on judicial resources, causes of action against
federal officers for violation of fourth amendment rights
should not be recognized.
0 See K. DAVIS, ADmINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT 509-10,
513-14 (3d ed. 1972), stating the modern view that
unless judicial review is statutorily precluded, there is
a presumption in favor of reviewability.
10Id. at 510.

rights to medical care and will focus on the substantive and procedural rights of convicts in federal
and state prisons. Cases dealing with prisoners in
special facilities will not be considered. For the
purposes of this article, "medical care" refers to
the heating and alleviating of physical ailments,
and to dental care. The right to psychiatric care
and the right to rehabilitative treatment are not
specifically considered. The conclusion will offer
some suggestions for changes in law and in ad-

ministrative practice which would result in better
medical care for prisoners with a minimum of
judicial interference in prison administration.
I. STATE LAW RELATING TO MEDICAL
CARE OF PRISONERS

A. Substantive Rights
Not all state statutes which regulate prison
affairs and the treatment of prisoners provide
standards for medical care. The Michigan statute,"
" The relevant Michigan statutes, MIcH. ComP.
LAws (1948), recite:

§ 800.15 It shall be the duty of the physician of
the prison:
First, To attend at all times to the wants of sick
convicts whether in the hospital, or i6 their cells,
and to bestow upon them all necessary medical service;
Second, In company ith the hall master, to ex-

amine weekly the cells of the convicts, for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are kept in a
proper state of cleanliness and ventilation, and if
they are not so kept to point out to said hall master the deficiencies, and report the same monthly

to the board of such prison;
Third, To prescribe the diet of sick convicts,

and his directions in relation thereto shall be
strictly followed; and to be present at and superintend all corporal punishments which may be inflicted in the prison;
Fourth, To keep a daily record of all admissions
to the hospital, and of cases treated in the cells or
elsewhere, indicating the sex, color, nativity, age,
occupation, habits of life, crime, period of entrance
and discharge from the hospital, and disease;
Fifth, To make a yearly report to the board of
the prison of the sanitary condition of the prison.
during the year, which report shall also contain a
condensed statement of the information contained
in his daily record;
Sixth, To make all such other reports as the
board or warden may from time to time require.
§ 800.16 It shall be the duty of such physician,
in case of any convict claiming to be unable to
labor by means of sickness, to examine such convict; and if it is his opinion upon such examination that such convict is unable to labor, he shall
immediately certify the same to the warden, and
such convict shall thereupon be relieved from labor
and admitted to the hospital, or placed in his cell
or elsewhere, for medical treatment, as said physician shall direct, having a due regard for the safekeeping of such convict- and such convict shall nnt
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for example, describes in detail the duties of the
prison physician, while in contrast the Texas
statuteu makes no direct reference to the health
of prisoners. Absent a statute, states rely on correctional administrators and medical officers to
supply the complex of goods and services which
amounts to adequate medical care. The best legislative approach wodild require the state corrections
department or public health service to adopt and
publish administrative rules specifying in detail
the care prisoners should receive. 3 In addition, an
effective statute would provide an administrative
procedure for enforcing those rules.' 4
When called upon to redress prisoners' allegations of inadequate medical treatment, the courts
have overwhelmingly adopted the position that
the jailor owes prisoners a duty of ordinary and
reasonable care for their health."5 This duty has
sometimes been interpreted to mean prisoners
must receive the kind of medical care that a
reasonable person would secure for himself if he
were free to do so. In Piscano v. State 16 a New York
be required to labor so long as in the opinion of
said physician such disability shall continue; and
whenever said physician shall certify to the warden
that such convict is sufficiently recovered as to be
able to labor said convict shall be required to labor.
§ 800.17 The necessary medicines and other hospital stores for the use of the prisons shall be purchased as other prison stores, but with the advice
of the physician and under the direction of the
warden.
ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 108, §32 (1971) is virtually iden-

tical to §800.15; § 33 is virtually identical to §800.16.
"The Texas statutes dealing with all aspects of
prison activity (Tx. Rzv. STAT. ANN. art. 6166-6203g
(1970)) occupy 70 pages in the code book while those
dealing with Patriotism and the Flag occupy 64 pages.
Of those 70 pages (including annotations) dealing
with the operation of State prisons, eight are concemed with the lease of prison lands for oil and gas.
The only sections which are even remotely concerned
with the health of prisoners deal with food (art. 6166t),
labor (art. 6166x), an emergency section to renovate a
prison (art. 6203), the establishment of a psychopathic
hospital (art. 6203e) and reports of death (art. 6166z).
See also Nxw YoRx CoRREcrIoN LAW, §70 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1971): "... the department may es-

tablish and maintain any type of institution or program of treatment, not inconsistent with other provisions of law, but with due regard to: ... (c) The
health and safety of every person in the custody of the
department."; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 31, 81, 101,
111, 352,372 (1964); MAss. A-N. LAWS ch. 127, §§ 16,
17, 18, 117, 151 (1965); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2084,
2690 (West 1970).
"See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 124, §1(b) (1965);
N.Y. Com=TcoN LAW §46 (7-a) (McKinney 1968).

"See text accompanying notes 141-47 infra.
15
See Sneidman, Prisoners at 453-56 and the cases
collected therein.
168 App. Div. 2d 335, 188 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1959).

appellate court found that the refusal of prison
doctors to administer cortisone to a prisoner
suffering from a painful back injury was based
solely upon the budgetary determination that two
dollars per day was too much to spend for this
treatment. The court held that the trial court
finding, that the state was not negligent, was unsupported by the evidence. In a criticism of the
medical judgment of the prison doctor, the court
articulated the rule that prison physicians owe the
same duty of care to prisoners as private physicians
owe to patients who are free to choose.' 7 Having
indicated its dissatisfaction with the doctor's
failure to prescribe the proper treatment and the
wardern's failure to remedy the mistreatment, the
court remanded for a new trial on the question of
negligence.
B. ProceduralRemedies
There are two broad categories of state court
remedies for complaints of medical mistreatment.
One remedy is the traditional suit- in tort for
personal injury. The other type of remedy is an
action seeking relief of an injunctive nature against
continuing wrongs. The injunctive suit has the
potential for more far-reaching impact on the
prison system, even though injunctive relief is
granted, if at all, only when a serious violation of
rights is shown.
Tort Remedies. Despite the fairly generous position of the courts in recognizing prisoners' substantive rights to necessaries such as medical care,
procedures for enforcement of these rights are
inadequate. 8 In New York, for example, prisoners
17Id. at 340, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The medical standard of care is traditionally held to be the standard of
care of the locality. Since state maximum security
prisons are usually located in remote rural areas this
rule could work to the disadvantage of a prisoner.
However, because of today's more rapid dissemination
of new medical knowledge the trend is toward abandonment of the locality rule. See Note, An Evaluation

of Change in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAwD. L.

REv. 729, 733-741 (1970).
IIn at least three states the usual duty to provide
reasonable medical care is qualified by the courts' refusal to provide tort remedies to prisoners. In Massachusetts early cases laid down a version of the hands
off rule by providing that denials of medical care are
actionable only on a showing of malice and not for
negligence. Williams v. Adams, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 171
(1871); O'Hare v. Jones, 161 Mass. 391, 37 N.E. 371
(1894). In Illinois the unavailability of a remedy is
based on the theory that the statutory duty of a sheriff
is quasi-judicial and therefore he cannot be sued for
the mere negligent omission to provide care. Bush v.
Babb, 23 1l1. App. 2d 285, 162 N.E.2d 594 (1959).
Maryland has followed the approaches of Illinois and
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are denied by statute their civil rights while in
prison, 19 including the right to sue. 20 This statutory
denial appears to be grounded in the common law
doctrine of civil death 2 ' Even at common law,
however, the civil death doctrine did not entirely
preclude legal activity by imprisoned felonsTn The
reason for the civil death doctrine was to protect
the inmate's family, and courts have often refused
to extend the doctrine to cases where its purpose
does not apply.2 In accord with this general
Massachusetts, State v. Ferling, 151 A.2d 137 (Md.
1959); Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A.2d 220
(1961). See generally Sneidman, Prisoners at 453.
"9 The loss of civil rights is known as "civil death."
N.Y. CIVIL RiGons LAW § 79 (McKinney Supp. 1971)
provides:
A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for
any term less than for life or a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for an indeterminate term,
having a minimum of one day and a maximum of
natural life, forfeits all the public offices, and suspends, during the term of the sentence, all the civil
rights, and all private trusts, authority, or powers
of, or held by, the person sentenced; but nothing
herein contained shall be deemed to suspend the
right or capacity of any of the following persons to
institute an action or proceedingin a court or before
a body or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or administrative functions, with respect to matters
other than those out of his arrest or detention:
a. A person sentenced to state prison for any
term less than for life or a person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison for an indeterminate
term, having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life, on whom sentence was
imposed and the execution of the judgment suspended, while the- execution of the judgment remains suspended;
b. A person sentenced to state prison for any
term less than for life or a person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison for an indeterminate
term, having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life, while he is released on parole, or after he has been discharged from parole.
20Burns v. City of New York, 21 App. Div. 2d 767,
250 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1964); Harrell v. State, 17 Misc.2d
950, 188 N.Y.S. 683. (Ct. Cl. 1959); Saxe v. Peck, 139
App. Div. 419, 124 N.Y.S. 14 (1910).
In New York the right to sue is guaranteed in language reminiscent of Magna Carta: "Neither justice
nor right should be sold to any person, nor denied, nor
deferred; ... " N.Y. CIvIL RiGHTS LAW §10 (McKinney
1948).
2
1Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 182 Misc.
678, 45 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943), af'd, 268 App.
Div. 854, 50 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1944), af'd, 294 N.Y. 743,
61 N.E.2d 745 (1945). The trial court criticized the
civil death statute as "ielic of a medieval fiction". 182
Misc. at 680, 45 N.Y.S. 2d at 719.
2 Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. R.-118 (1822).
23
See Garner v. Shulte Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 127, 129,
259 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162-63 (1965), indicating that the
purpose of the doctrine is to protect the innocent wife
or children of a prisoner. The civil death doctrine has
been thought generally inapplicable for the additional
reason that at common law, only prisoners convicted
of a felony punishable by death were deemed civilly
dead. Shapiro, supra note 21.
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approach, the civil death restriction on lawsuits
has been weakened by both legislatures and the
courts.2
Relieffor Continuing Wrongs. The writ of habeas
corpus is the method most often used by state
prisoners seeking injunctive relief.25 State couits
24
In New York at the present time, suits may be
maintained by defendants receiving suspended sentences, by parolees, and by defendants released under
conditional pardon or commutation. N.Y. CIvIL
RIGHTS LAW §79a, §79-a(3) (McKinney Supp.
1971); White v. State, 260 App. Div. 413, 23 N.Y.S.2d
526 (1940), aff'd, 285 N. Y. 728,34 N.E.2d 896 (1941).
Suits may also be brought under special enabling legislation. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 397, 400 (1965). Prisoners may also defend actions brought against them.
Garner v. Garner, 59 Misc.2d 29, 297 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1969); Lipschultz v. State, 192 Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d
731 (Ct. Cl. 1948). Suits may be brought by prisoners
in federal detention and county jails. Hill v. Gentry,
280 F.2d 88, (8th Cir. 1960); Bowles v. Haberman, 95
N.Y. 246 (1884). It should also be noted that a former
prisoner may sue and his right of action is preserved by
the tolling of the statute of limitations until his release.
N.Y. CIVIL PRAcTicE LAW AND RuLEs § 208 (McKinney 1972).
However, prisoners must sometimes bear procedural
burdens greater than those borne by free litigants. In
tort actions brought against the state, any claim must
be filed within ninety days "unless the claimant shall

file a written notice of intention to file a claim ... , in

which event the claim shall be filed within two years
after the accrual of such claim." N.Y. CoURT oF CLAiMs
ACT § 10(3) (McKinney 1963). But since an injured
prisoner's right to file a claim while in prison is suspended, his only procedure is to file a notice of intention within ninety days, and to present the claim itself
within two years after the disability is removed. The
result is that a prisoner suing the state must file two
notices of his tort claim while free citizens need file only
one. See Federman v. State, 173 Misc. 830, 19 N.Y.S.
2d 325 (Ct. Cl. 1940); Baroness v. State, 153 Misc. 212,
274 N.Y.S; 2d 522 (Ct. Cl. 1934). The prisoner may also
be relegated to a long wait before he is released and can
present his claim to a court.
In some situations however, prisoners' disabilities
may not necessarily bind substituted parties. Garner
v. Schulte Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1965) is an example. The wife of a state prisoner filed
a claim in his name for recovery of workmen's compensation, contending that since her husband was serving
a life sentence, he was civilly dead. The court reversed
the denial of the claim by the Workman's Compensation Board, holding that the prisoner's wife could recover as if her husband were actually dead, so long as
the claim were prosecuted in the wife's name. While
the decision is based on the civil death doctrine, the
court managed to limit the doctrine to its historical
purpose while permitting a substituted party to recover
even though the prisoner could not. One commentator
has suggested that because Garner allows an action to
be brought by a substituted party, it undercuts the
theory and practice of the civil death statute. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15
BUp:FALo
L. REV. 397, 404 (1965).
2
1 Other available remedies are Article 78 proceedings,
i.e., proceedings in the nature of certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition. N.Y. CrvIL PRAcTicE LAW AND RurEs
§§7801-06 (McKinney 1963).
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have taken three distinct approaches in ruling on
prisoners' habeas corpus petitions. First, they have
denied relief,26 not on the merits, but because of
the self-imposed jurisdictional barrier of the
hands-off doctrine, or because of one of the
traditional limitations of habeas corpus:.2 administrative remedies have not been exhausted,3 or
habeas relief is limited to total release onlym and
is not available to challenge the form of confinement when the prisoner is lawfully in custody."0
A second class of state courts grant habeas corpus relief where the prisoner can show that this
treatment, or the lack of it, amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment." In these cases the rule is
still that the courts will not interfere in ordinary
prison administration unless a prisoner's allegations
21Phillips v. State, 133 So.2d 512 (Ala. 1961); Holman v. State ex rel. Eyman, 5 Ariz. App. 311, 426 P.2d
411 (1967); DeMoss v. Rhodes, 133 A.2d 918 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1957); State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555 (Del
Super. Ct. 1965); Bennett v. Robbins, 243 A.2d 61
(Me. 1968); Edmondson v. Warden, 194 Md. 707, 69
A.2d 919 (1949); State ex rd. Renner v. Wright, 188
Md. 189, 51 A.2d 668 (1947); Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb.
67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955); Rogers v. Warden, 84 Nev.
539, 445 P.2d 28 (1968); Newton v. Cupp, 465 P.2d
734 (Ore. App. 1970); State v. Mathewson, 477 P.2d
222 (Ore. App. 1970); Gibbs v. Gladden, 227 Ore. 102,
359 P.2d 540 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961);
Commonwealth ex rel. Hoffman v. Maroney, 203 Pa.
Super. 303, 201 A.2d 263 (1964), but see Commonwealth
ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965);
State ex rel. Jordan v. Bomar, 217 Tenn. 494, 398
S.W.2d 724 (1965).
'7 See generally Beyond the Ken at 508-12 and the
cases collected therein.
28 Commonwealth ex rel. Thompson v. Day, 182 Pa.
Super. 644, 128 A. 2d 133 (1956).
2See, e.g., Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 344-49,
44 A.2d 807, 808-12 (1945); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 465-68 (1938) (indicating habeas corpus may
not be used as a writ of error, but only as a challenge
to a judgment which is void, because, for example, imposed by a court without jurisdiction).
If the habeas corpus remedy were not limited to
total discharge but were equitable in nature, courts
might be encouraged to consider habeas petitions
raising other issues besides the question of jurisdiction
of the convicting court. See Mahaffey v. State, 87
Idaho 228, 230-31, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964).
30Application of Dunn, 150 Neb. 669,35 N.W.2d 673,
677 (1949). (The proper function of habeas corpus is to
challenge the validity of the judgment, sentence and
commitment).
"1See generally Sneidman, Prisonersat 461-63. California, followed by several other states has granted such
relief. In re Riddle, 57 Cal.2d 848, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472,
372 P.2d 304 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 914 (1962);
Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964);
State ex rd. Cole v. Tahash, 269 Minn. 1, 129 N.W.2d
903 (1964); Best v. Page, 422 P.2d 210 (Old. Cr. 1966);
Hughes v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 128, 378 P.2d 888
(1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 846 (1963).

contain "inexcusable and shocking" facts which go
beyond matters of prison discipline."
A third approach to habeas corpus would apparently allow relief where only an administrative
decision is challenged, even if no constitutional
question is raised. This liberal approach was suggested by the New York Court of Appeals in
People ex rel. Brown v. Johnson." There a prisoner
applied for habeas corpus to challenge his transfer
from a prison to a hospital for the criminally
insane. The court held that the writ was improperly
denied because the appellate court failed to inquire
whether petitioner's removal could been "uncontrolled and arbitrary."4 The teaching of the
lohnson opinion is that habeas corpus cannot be
used to challenge the final judgment of a competent court but it is available to challenge "any
further restraint in excess of that permited by the
judgment or constitutional guarantees." "5 Petitioner's transfer to a hospital for the criminally
insane would be a restraint in excess of that imposed by his conviction, and he was thus entitled
to a hearing on his sanity. The court concluded its
opinion with the dictum that when an excessive
restraint is alleged, the writ of habeas corpus need
not present constitutional questions. 6 If taken at
face value, this language in Johnson could heavily
involve New York courts in prison affairs.' 7 In the
"'See, e.g., Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d
279 (1964), where the habeas corpus petition alleged a
prima fade case of cruel and unusual punishment. The
court reversed denial of the writ and remanded. The
court reasoned that Idaho statutes did not require that
a prisoner be discharged if his petition is granted.
Rather, Idaho courts may fashion a just remedy. The
decision, however, might apply only to situations
where habeas corpus is petitioner's sole remedy. The
court, perhaps fearing a flood of petitions, cautioned
that false allegations in application for habeas corpus
would subject the petitioner to the risk of punishment
for perjury.
9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44
(1961).
4Id. at 484, 174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
The Appellate Division denied the application for
habeas corpus on the sole ground that habeas corpus is
not available to challenge the place of confinement
under a valid commitment.
5Id. at 485,174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
361d. at 486, 174 N.E.2d at 726-27, 215 N.Y.S.2d
at 46.
37See, e.g., People ex rel. LaBelle v. Harriman, 35
App. Div. 2d 13, 312 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1970) (granting
petition which alleged denial of the right to a speedy
trial and indicating habeas corpus may be used to obtain relief other than release from custody); Supreme
Court ex rd. Cardona v. Singerman, 63 Misc.2d 509,
312 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (granting petition
which alleged overlong detention in jail prior to transfer
to a narcotics rehabilitation program and expressing
"an obligation [under Brown] to protect a prisoner from
unlawful or onerous treatment."); People ex rel. Berry
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absence of a truly effective administrative remedy,
the liberal New York approach would seem to be
most consistent with justice, but it appears fanciful
to hope that other states will follow its lead when
most do not yet consider even cruel and unusual
punishment issues raised by application for habeas
corpus.
II.

LAW RELATING TO MEDICAL CARE

or FEDERAL PRISONERS
A. Substantive Rights

In the federal law as in state law the primary
duty to provide medical care to prisoners is statutorily vested in the executive branch of the
government. The Attorney General of the United
States stands at the pinnacle of the federal prison
hierarchy and is charged with "control and management of Federal penal and correctional institutions." 18 Under him the Bureau of Prisons is
given the rather vague and general direction to
"provide suitable quarters and provide for the
safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the
United States. . . ." 11 The law also provides that
various officers of the Public Health Service may
be detailed to the Department of Justice "for the
purpose of supervising and furnishing medical,
psychiatric, and other technical and scientific
services to the Federal penal and correctional
institutions." 40
Aside from actions for personal injuries arising
from negligence when the standard of care is the
same as that of a free citizen, 4' the federal prisoner
v. McGrath, 61 Misc.2d 113, 305 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup.
Ct. 1969) (denying petition which failed to establish a
prima fade showing of cruel and unusual punishment,
but indicating habeas corpus is available to a petitioner
in custody pending trial who alleges cruel and unusual
treatment under circumstances giving rise to an inference that the treatment will continue unless relief is
granted). The court in McGrath saw the New York
cases as effecting a "subtle expansion of the availability of the writ of habeas corpus." 61 Misc.2d at 115,
305 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
18 U.S.C. §4001 (1964). See also Owens v. Alldridge,
311 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Okla. 1970): "The Attorney General, and not the courts, has the discretion as
to what type of medical care is to be furnished a prisoner." Accord, Graham v. ,illingham, 384 F. 2d 367
(10th Cir. 1967); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329,
337 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
09 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (2) (1964).
4018 U.S.C. § 4005 (a) (1964).
4
See Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679, 688
(N.D. Ga. 1966), rez'd on other grounds, 389 F. 2d 689
(5th Cir. 1967): "[Tlhe government has a duty of protection and safekeeping. In the discharge of that duty
the government must exercise ordinary care in (1) the
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must show more than that he received inadequate
medical care.42 Relief may be granted if a prisoner
can show that he was denied medical treatment in
such a way as to amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.43 It has been suggested that cruel and
unusual punishment results from an intentional
denial of needed medical treatment, or from "reckless disregard, callous inattention, or gross negligence." 4 Even if arbitrary and capricious conduct
on the part of prison officials is charged, it appears
petitioner must also allege that medical care was
administered as punishment. 45 Under these rules
the following have been held not to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment: allowing nonmedical
personnel to treat a prisoner, either with or without the prisoner's consent; 46 administering a drug
by force, as a "last resort"; 47 confinement and
segregation for more than two years when imposed
not for disciplinary control but as an administrative control for the protection of inmates;4' and
striking a prisoner when the beating is part of a
justified attempt to search the prisoner.
classification of prisoners and in (2) the custody of
prisoners properly classified."
42 Owens v. Aldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D.
Okla. 1970); Sanders v. United States, 438 F. 2d 918
(5th Cir. 1971); Murphey v. Surgeon General, 269
F. Supp. 227 (D. Kan. 1967).
4'Owens v. Aldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D.
Okla. 1970). See also the other cases cited in note 42,
supra,and the addendum to the opinion of Chief Judge
Becker in Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 604-05
(W.D. Mo. 1970).

4 Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600,605 (W.D.M.
1970).
45 Owens v. Alldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D.
Okla. 1970).
46Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
4
1Id. at 337.
"' Graham v. Willingham, 384 F. 2d 367 (10th Cir.
1967); accord, United States ex rel. Keen v. Mazurkeiwicz, 306 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
41 Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585,
591-92
(W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1969).
Habeas corpus did entitle petitioner to relief, however, in Darsey v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 1346
(W.D. Mo. 1970). Petitioner had been imprisoned in
seventeen different federal institutions within eleven
months. He alleged that this constant movement
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and the
court agreed after only a "cursory review" of the evidence and testimony. Darsey is unusual because its
facts are no more shocking than in other habeas corpus
cases where the cruel and unusual punishment argument was rejected. For example, in Owens v. Alldridge,
311 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Okla. 1970), petitioner made
the conclusory allegation of cruel and unusual punishment. The court examined the facts and characterized
the petition as alleging gross negligence or arbitrary and
capricious conduct, both of which require an additional
showing that the medical treatment received was administered as a punishment. In contrast, the Darsey
court did not try to characterize petitioner's allegations.
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B. ProceduralRemedies
'Tort Remedy. The federal government was slow
in abandoning the rule of sovereign immunity.
When it finally did so in 1946, no specific language
in the Federal Tort Claims Act" precluded suits
by prisoners in federal institutions. Several federal
courts, however, construed the act as forbidding
prisoner recoveries.5 ' In 1962, the Second Circuit
brokewith this view, holding in Winston v. United
States" and Muniz v. United States" that federal
prisoners could sue under the Federal Tort Claims
Act to recover for injuries received through the
negligence of government employees. The Supreme
Court affirmed both decisions in United States v.
Muniz.5 ' Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
Court, found in the legislative history of the act a
clear intent that prisoners' claims be allowed. The
opinion also dismissed the argument that the
government would have to litigate frivolous cases
and found no history of disciplinary problems in
states which already allowed prisoners' tort
claims. 5 The Court concluded by noting that the
policy of the Federal Tort Claims Act, to provide
relief to those who are injured by the negligence
of government employees, should not be narrowed
at a time when state courts were trying to abrogate
sovereign immunity."6
In addition to the Tort Claims Act, the Federal
Prison Industries Corporation is empowered to
pay out of the Prison Industries Fund "compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries
suffered in any industry or in any work activity in
connection with the maintenance or operation of
the institution where confined." 7 Such compensation is not to exceed the amounts provied in the
Federal Employees Compensation Act," and
It was apparently satisfied petitioner had been "mistreated" and had suffered "unnecessary hardship."
Although the court found that it could not release
petitioner from confinement, it recognized that "in circunstances involving continuing cruel and unusual
punishment, ... the Court is empowered to fashion appropriate equitable relief ..." 318 F. Supp. at 1348.
1028 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1964).
" Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958);
Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
5305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962).
374 U.S. 150 (1963).
"Id. at 163.
"Id. at 164-66. Actions under the federal act are
still limited. The government is not liable for negligence arising out of discretionary acts, nor for the intentional torts of its employees. Id. at 163.
"18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964).
58Id.

recovery under this act precludes recovery under
the Tort Claims Act.59
Remedies for Continuing Wrongs. As discussed
earlier, the principles regarding the substantive
rights of federal prisoners to medical care do not
differ substantially from those applied to state
prisoners by federal courts. Similarly, the philosophy of the federal courts, that all prisoners must
have reasonable access to courts to complain about
continuing and serious medical wrongs, does not
differ from the state court view. In an addendum
to the opinion in Ramsey v. Ciccone"0 Chief Judge
Becker suggested that the available remedies for
continuing wrongs to federal prisoners in medical
care cases are habeas corpus, suit for injunction,
suit for declaratory judgment, and suit for damages. He concluded that habeas corpus is the preferred remedy,6 ' largely because the writ is well
adapted to quick resolution of inmates' claims.

III. FEDER.AL LAW in STATE PRISONS
A. The Hands-Off Doctrine Amplified by Federalism
The extension of the Federal Tort Claims Act
to federal prisoners was characterized as "merely
a tidying up oleration"' 2 after the larger legislative reform of overturning federal sovereign
immunity. In the area of prisoners' rights the
greater struggle was yet to come. The overwhelming number of maximum security prisoners
were in state institutions and federal courts almost
unanimously denied them redress.6 The reluctance
on the part of the federal courts to interfere was
based not only on the hands-off doctrine" but also
on considerations of federalism. While there is
some question as to the present status of the
hands-off doctrine, there is broad agreement in
the federal courts that the doctrine is not a bar
where deprivations alleged are of constitutional
dimension. Courts have not, however, satisfactorily
resolved the ideological"5 and practical 66 questions
59United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
60
310 F. Supp. 600, 604 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
61
Id. at 606.
12 Beyond the Ken at 506.
"Id. at 508.
'See text accompanying notes 5-7 Supra.
6s In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) a federal
district court injunction prevented a Los Angeles district attorney from prosecuting Harris under California
statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the injunction was "a violation of the national policy forbiding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances." Id. at
41. The decision in Younger proscribes federal action
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that arise when a federal court issues orders to
state prison officials or finds them liable in damages.
The most extensive federal court involvement
with state prisons has been in Holt v. Sarver,67
where a class action brought on behalf of prisoners
at various institutions in Arkansas resulted in a
blanket injunction over two penal institutions.
The district court's injunction ordered prison
officials to "take the necessary steps to bring the
operation of the prisons up to federal constitutional
requirements... . 6 The court granted prison
officials time to correct violations of federal constitutional rights, but retained jurisdiction "to take
such further steps as may be appropriate" to
implement its injunction.69 This case represents
the furthest reach of the federal courts into state
prison affairs. More significantly, it may be the
beginning of a trend.70 In enforcing and vindicating
once a state prosecution has begun. However, no indication is given that the decision also applies to state administrative agencies. The agency situation is different
because, unlike a state court which will quickly reach
a judgment which may be reviewable in federal court,
an administrative agency may continue its low visibility activity indefinitely. There is, therefore, less
need to enjoin state court proceedings than agency proceedings. The Younger case, however, may indicate a
shift in emphasis that will have an impact in al areas of
federal-state litigation, limiting somewhat the permissible range of federal court involvement in state affairs.
66 One practical problem is the difficulty of reviewing
increasing numbers of applications for relief. See
Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739, 740 (N.D.N.Y.
1966), reu'd, 387 F.2d 519 (2nd Cir. 1967); Gittlemacker
v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 2-3 (3d Cir. 1970). Another
practical problem is that federal judges are uncomfortable and perhaps reluctant when asked to interfere
in state prison affairs. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 183-85, 205 (2d Cir. 1971); Wright v.
McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 527 (2d Cir. 1967) (concurring
opinion of Chief Judge Lumbard); Hall v. Wainwright,
441 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1971); Sawyer v. Sigler 445 F.2d
818, 819 (8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971); Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 951
(8th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968).
67442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming the issuance
of an injunction by the district court).
61
Id. at 305. Included in the complaint were allegations, later proven, that defendants deprived prisoners
of their right to be fed, housed and clothed without loss
of life or health. Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.
Ark. 1969); Holt v. Sarver 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1969).
69442 F. 2d at 305.
7
0A Virginia district court recently issued an injunction
prohibiting disciplinary practices which were alleged
to violate due process and humane treatment. The
class action brought by the ACLU will affect 5700
state prisoners in 36 facilities in Virginia. The decision
specifies minimum standards and orders sweeping management reforms. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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constitutional rights in this way, federal courts
may incidentally strain harmonious relations
between federal and state authorities. Until such
time as prison systems act to prevent gross violations of basic rights, however, federal judges will
have no other alternative consonant with their
sworn duty.7
B. ProceduralRemedies
Habeas corpus. It has been asserted that "habeas
corpus has been the device most commonly employed by prisoners seeking relief from denials of
constitutional rights." 72 This is probably no longer
true for prisoners attacking violations of their
rights involving internal prison matters. In addition to the hurdle of the hands-off doctrine, relief
under habeas corpus always posed inherent difficulties for prisoners. First was the rule that the
writ was available only to attack the validity of
confinement, not the manner. Some courts, however, abandoned this rule after the decision of the
Sixth Circuit in Coffin v. ReichardT3 which indicated
that habeas corpus was available to attack "any
unlawful restraint of personal liberty." 74 Second,
habeas corpus was refused unless the prisoner was
entitled to absolute releaseY5 This has not been the
7 One mechanism which federal courts might use to
reduce their involvement in state prison affairs is the
doctrine of abstention. However Judge Kaufman in
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1967)
rejected abstention, indicating that abstention would
sacrifice an individual's right to federal adjudication,
that the Supreme Court has favored only narrow use
of the doctrine, and that the doctrine, although not
dead, is least applicable in cases presenting civil rights
questions.

,2Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners: The Devel-

oping Law, 110 U.PA.L.REv. 985, 1006 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Developing Law).
7'143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). Petitioner had been
returned to prison after he violated probation. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that at the
time he pled guilty he was incapable of discussing his
case with his attorney, and that his confession was
improperly obtained. The district judge refused to
grant leave to file for the writ, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded, finding petitioner's allegations
were sufficient to require respondent to show cause why
a writ should not issue. Petitioner had also filed another
petition for habeas corpus with the Sixth Circuit, alleging that he suffered injuries while in confinement. The
court referred this second petition along with the origi-

nal petition to the district court and, in an effort to
guide the district judge, the court observed that petitioner would be entitled to a writ if his confinement
was made "more burdensome" than the law allows.
Id.74at 445.
Id. at 445.
15See Developing Law at 1006-07; Comment, The
Inadequacy of Prisoners' Rights to Provide Sulcient
Protection for Those Confined in Penal Institutions, 48
N. C. L. Rlv. 847, 874 (1970).
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law since Peyton v. Rowe," where the Supreme
Court held that the writ was available to a convicted prisoner, serving consecutive sentences, who
petitioned for habeas corpus to attack the validity
of his second sentence but did not challenge the
correctness of his confinement under the first
sentence. Peyton led to the fashioning of what
amounts to equitable relief under the umbrella of
habeas corpusY.
Civil Rights Act. Although the same cofnstitutional rights may be protected by both habeas
corpus and the Civil Rights Act s an important
difference between the two types of action is the
requirement that state remedies be exhausted before a federalhabeas corpus action can be brought. 9
Even before Monroe v. Pape'0 ended the exhaustion
requirment for civil rights actions, the Civil Rights
Act was interpreted so as to protect the rights
secured to prisoners under the Constitution.8 '
76 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
77The Court stated, id. at 66-67:
But the statute does not deny the federal court
power to fashion appropriate relief other than immediate release.... Thus, to the extent that McNally
relied on the notion that immediate physical release
was the only remedy under the federal writ of habeas
corpus, it finds no support in the statute and has
been rejected by this Court in subsequent decisions.
The importance of the habeas corpus remedy is reflected in the Court's decision in Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969). There the Court struck down a prison
rule which forbade prisoners to assist fellow prisoners
in. preparing habeas corpus petitions. The Court's
opinion reveals it will not tolerate impairment of a
prisoner's federal right to petition for habeas corpus,
even where the impairment is caused by a prison regulation which serves a valid administrative purpose.
Id. at 486.
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (3) (1964). See the opinion
of Judge Coffin in Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 551
(1st Cir. 1970):
We see no sound basis for putting the constitutional rights protected by the writ on a higher plane
than those cognizable under section 1983, particularly since there are instances where the same right
might be asserted under either form of relief.
7
1See Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68 (D. Wis.
1971).
80365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court held that fourth
amendment violations by state officials constitute a
deprivation of rights cognizable by the federal courts
under the Civil Rights Act, § 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964). The broad interpretation put on the Act by
the Court gives the case a significance far greater than
its narrow holding. See generally, Shapo, Constitutional
Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U. L. REv. 277 (1965) (Hereinafter cited, Shapo,
ConstitutionalTort).
81It is interesting to note that the three early cases
granting relief cited 'in Beyond the Ken at 512 n.33,
involve allegations of medical mistreatment: Coleman
v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); McCollum
v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Gordon
v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Il1. 1948).

Despite some hesitancy, the courts did allow actions under the act, at least where the deliberate
failure to provide medical care was under the
color of state law and was regarded as a deprivation
of rights secured by the Constitution.P
After Monroe, however, federal courts were
flooded with civil rights actions of all kinds.P
Monroe is of singular importance because the
Court, after an extensive review of legislative
history, concluded that the remedy provided by
the Civil Rights Act is "supplementary" to the
state remedy, thus the state remedy need not be
exhausted before federal relief is sought. The act
"provided a remedy where state law was inadequate" and "provide[d] a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice." 4 Federal courts have regulated the number of civil rights actions, however,
by narrowly defining federal rights. Federal courts
thus occupy a middle ground with respect to
involvement in state prisons partly because of the
judiciary's well-recognized reluctance to oversee
the operations of prisons. 8 5
To be successful, a civil rights action must show
that federal rights have been violated. The rights
which have been invoked with the greatest effectiveness are the eighth amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment, and the
fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection clauses 8 Not every deprivation, however, reaches the magnitude of a constitutional
violation. For example, the rule in the Second
Circuit is that, to be actionable, a failure to provide
medical care must "shock the conscience" or in
some way exceed mere negligence.P One might
question a rule which relies on a "shocks the conscience" test, inasmuch as that test has been discredited in search and seizure4 and other areas of
state administration of criminal justicePn While
82McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 114
(D. Cal. 1955).
8 Shapo, Constitutional Tort at 278.
84Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961). See
Note, .Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEo.
L. J. 1270 (1969); Note, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, An
Emerging Vehidcle of Post-Conviction Remedy for State
Prisoners,22 U. FLA. L. R1v. 596 (1970).
85 See United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy,
112 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
86Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57
GEo. L. J. 1270, 1281 (1969).
8 Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir.
1969).
'8Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
89
See, e.g., Escobedo v. llinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the test is outmoded for some purposes, it is consonant with the hands-off doctrine and gives needed
latitude to prison administrators. The test is also
consistent with the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act, which was aimed primarily at egregious
violations of rights.90 Without question, most
federal courts balance prisoners' rights against a
policy in favor of prison administration, with the
result that only "outrageous" 91 violations of rights
are likely to be remedied."
The fact that many civil rights complaints are
submitted pro se by prisoners causes practical and
procedural problems for federal courts. For example, the complaints may be so vague and conclusory
they they fail to allege constitutional deprivations
with the necessary specificity. 3 On the other hand,
"0See generally, Shapo, Constitutional Tort at 280-

81.
"Id. at 305, discussing prisoners' rights cases in
general: "If a test emerges from this group of cases,
it may be described as an 'outrageousness' requirement."
Similarly other federal circuits deny recovery unless the deprivation of rights is in some way extraordinary. In the Third Circuit an allegation of improper
medical care alone "is legally insufficient to establish a
denial of rights secured under the federal constitution
or laws" and states a cause of action only when the
treatment or lack of it is cruel and unusual. Fear v.
Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 935 (1969); Pennsylvania ex rel.
Gatewood v.
Hendrick, 368 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 925 (1967). In the Fourth Circuit a denial of
medical care which seriously endangers a prisoner's
physical well-being raises an issue of cruel and unusual
punishment and requires a hearing. Edwards v. Duncan,
355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Hirons v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613, (4th Cir. 1965).
In the Fifth Circuit the test is one of abuse of discretion, and in a number of recent cases complaints as to
the inadequacy of ordinary treatment have been held
not to be abuses of discretion. Schack v. Florida, 391
F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 916
(1968); Oakes v. Wainwright, 430 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.
1970); Haskew v. Wainwright, 429 F.2d 525 (5th Cir.
1970); Weaver v. Beto, 429 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1970).
In the Seventh Circuit, a prisoner does not have a
cognizable complaint under the Civil Rights Act unless
he can show exceptional circumstances, such as the
total denial of medical care. Coleman v. Johnson, 247
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957). In Ninth Circuit cases, inadequate medical care or termination of medical care
which does not seriously injure a prisoner does not
state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.
Snow v. Gladden, 388 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964). However a refusal to care for histoplasmosis, a form of
tuberculosis, was sufficient to entitle plaintiff to a hearing on his complaint. Riley v. Rhay, 407 F.2d 496
(9th Cir. 1969). Finally, in the Tenth Circuit, a "claim
of total denial of medical care differs from a claim of
inadequacy of medical care" and a "difference of opinion between the lay wishes of the patient and the professional diagnosis of the doctor" does not state a cause
of action under the Civil Rights Act. Coppinger v.
Townshend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1968).
"See Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir.
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the complaint may be so long and complicated,
and involve so many defendants, as to place a
severe burden on the time and resources of the
courts.' 4 The basic problem is one concerning legal
aid to prisoners but is tangentially related to all
other rights. 0
Another procedural remedy concerns the necessity of an evidentiary hearing in section 1983 cases.
In the absence of an answer to the complaint or an
evidentiary hearing, the facts must be construed
in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. 8 A section
1983 case may be dismissed without hearing if it
fails to state a cause of action.' 7 But where the
allegations are sufficiently serious, some determination of the underlying facts should be undertaken before judgment is rendered."8 Prisoners may
therefore be tempted to include exaggerated facts
in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing. The
fear of great numbers of suits may not be justified
but it is perceived as a problem. Too often this
fear obscures the more accurate difficulty: the
virtual unavailability of effective legal counsel and
sound administrative remedies for prisoners. These
should be available to every prisoner, not merely
to those fortunate enough to be incarcerated in an
enlightened institution or near an activist law
school. Counsel would serve to draw more artful
complaints and screen frivolous actions. Meanwhile the courts should be slow to dismiss complaints with serious allegations, even if they present
farfetched statements of facts.
The problem of increasing numbers of prisoner
complaints has led courts to fashion shorthand
methods of ruling on them. One court pointed out
that in medical care cases an examination of the
prisoner's record may be dispositive of the case,
especially where the allegation is denial of care by
1970). A related problem is that pro se complaints are
often hard to fit into neat legal slots. Nevertheless, the
courts are generally lenient in accepting such complaints despite the title affixed and classify the cases
in a way most beneficial to the petitioner. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir.
rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 249 (1971): "In this
circuit we have accepted jurisdiction on complaints
denominated as habeas corpus, writs of mandamus, and
petition for physical examination as petitions for injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Statutes .... "
9Roberts
v. Barbosa, 227 F.Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal.
1964).
9"See remarks of Brennan, J. in Wright v. McMann,
257 F. Supp. 739, 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
"1Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d
613, 614 (4th Cir. 1965).
7See, e.g., United States ex rtl. Lawrence v. Ragen
323 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
"Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1970).
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a physician." Where such records contain no information on the subject matter of the complaint,
an evidentiary hearing is called for.100
Another shorthand device is used by the Ninth
Circuit, which does not allow the complainant to
be present at the hearing of his case.101 While this
rule makes it easier to pass on complaints, it may
be damaging to the complainant because he is
usually a necessary witness. The same court has,
however, specified a complainant's procedural
rights and they appear to ameliorate the absence
of the right to be present at the hearing:
He is... entitled to have: (1) process issued arid
served; (2) notice of any motion thereafter made
by defendant or by the court to dismiss the complaint and the grounds therefore; (3) an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such a motion; (4) in the event of dismissal, a statement of the grounds therefore; and
(5) an opportunity to amend the complaint to
overcome the deficiency uriless it clearly appears
from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be
12
overcome by amendment.
The Ninth Circuit's procedural compromise
between a full evidentiary hearing and summary
dismissal of the complaint is similar to the "amplifying" procedure explained by the District of
Columbia Circuit in United States v. Simpson. °n
The "amplifying" procedure may be used in cases
where the petition's allegations are too conclusory
or general for the court to treat, but the court feels
the complaint may have merit if it were artfully
drawn.1' 4 In such cases the court issues an order
and accompanies it with a memorandum tb the
prisoner telling him to file, in his own words, the
specific facts and details of his grievance' 05 The
Simpson court hinted that a complaint might be
best amplified by appointing counsel to assist in
the preparation of the petition. 06
It is interesting-and perhaps significant-that
these circuit courts have adopted different yet
parallel approaches in an attempt to salvage
meritorious complaints while relieving somewhat
the burden of holding an evidentiary hearing. Yet
9 Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir.
1969).
100
Id. at 221.
101433
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1970).
02
Id. at 1088. See Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165 (D. Md. 1971).
]3436F.2d 162, 166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
14 Id.at 166.
105
Id. at 166 n.12.
1o0Id.at 166-67..

these approaches are flawed because without
adequate and expert legal assistance in the prison,
courts will not be able to correctly separate the
frivolous from the meritorious complaint. 07 This
problem is central to the adequate provision and
vindication of prisoners' rights to medical care
and will be examined thoroughly in the conclusion
to this paper.
The class action, as seen in the Arkansas"°s and
Virginian cases, can effectively change conditions
throughout a state prison system. Instead of
affecting the rights of a single prisoner, one case
can have dramatic impact on thousands of inmates.
Two arguments are forwarded to defeat class action
in civil rights suits. The first is the practical problem of giving notice to large numbers of inmates
and parolees." 0 The second is that since a civil
rights.action is said to be available only in shocking
or egregious cases, each prisoner's case should be
treated individually."' The latter argument carries
more force when the action is brought for damages
than when injunctive relief is sought. Neither
argument, however, should deter a court from
granting injunctive relief to a class when federal
rights are violated through general conditions
rather than through numerous individual incidents 112
C. Habeas Corpus and Civil Rights Actions Compared; Herein of Exhaustion of State Renedies
The distinction between habeas corpus and civil
rights actions has become quite blurred. The language of some courts could indicate that there is
no longer a distinction and that in any suit brought
by state prisoners in federal court, the form of a
07

1 Id.

Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968);
Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (use of
strap amounts to cruel and unusual punishment regardless of any precautionary conditions which may
by imposed; the court restrained use of corporal punishment throughout Arkansas prison system).
109 Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Va.
1971).
"1Heckart v. Pate, 9 Cr. L. 2228 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
In Milwaukee v. Paterson, 51 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis.
1970) the court pointed out that because many jail
inmates have no permanent place of abode, notifying
them of a class action would be difficult. This argument
is of questionable validity because it would prevent a
class action by some jail inmates merely because the
poverty or life styles of others makes them hard to
reach.
lu Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 137 (N.D.
N.Y. 1970).
"'Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D.
Ohio 1971).
"13
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cause of action is interchangeable. The opinion of
Judge Doyle in Edwards v. Schmidt"' recognized
this apparent interchangeability and its important
consequence that petitions will be characterized
as civil rights actions to avoid the need for exhaustion of state remedies. This characterization
is made on the correct assumption that a state
prisoner must exhaust state remedies before a writ
of habeas corpus will issue, but a prisoner seeking
relief under the Civil Rights Act need not exhaust
state remedies." 4
It becomes essential, therefore, to differentiate
between th6 habeas corpus and section 1983 categories, in order to prevent circumvention of the
requirement in habeas corpus cases that state remedies be exhausted. Judge Doyle offered the distinction that some suits are "traditional habeas
corpus suits" while others are "extraordinary
prisoner suits." "' The former simply attacks the
validity of the state court judgment. In the latter,
the prisoner concedes that he is lawfully imprisoned, but claims he is deprived of a constitutional
right which he is entitled even inside prison. Judge
Doyle's approach, however, is not simply an attempt to fit cases into the two categories he suggests. Rather, it is an attempt to identify the issues
with respect to which exhaustion of state remedies
6
should be required."
Judge Doyle's description of section 1983 actions
as "extraordinary prisoner suits" is consistent with
the underlying purposes of the federal civil rights
remedy as determined by the legislative history
in Monroe v. Pape,"7 in law review articles,"' and
in the cases dealing with prisoner's rights to
medical care.119 The rule is that in extraordinary
prisoner suits, complaining of internal prison conditions, the proper remedy is a section 1983 action.
it is in the light of this rule that the broad language
of Judge Coffin in Nolan v. ScafatiPn or the very
liberal approach of Judge (now Mr. Justice)
Blackmun in Jackson v. Bishop' is to be understood. In contrast, where a prisoner launches a
collateral attack on his conviction in state court
he is in the area of "traditional habeas corpus
" 321 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
U4 Id. at 69.
"I Id.at 70.
n6 Id. at 73-74.
' 365 U.S. at 168-87.
u See, e.g., Shapo, Conslihaional Tort at 279-82.
u See note 92 supra.
"2 340 F.2d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 1970).
"' 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).

suits" and the circumvention rule applies to require
exhaustion of state remedies.ln
The most recent treatment of this subject is a
per curiam decision by the Supreme Court in
Wilwording v. Swenson.12 Petitioners filed a writ of
habeas corpus challenging living conditions and
disciplinary measures in a state prison. Such a
complaint, which does not attack the validity of
the state court judgment, would be included in
Judge Doyle's "extraordinary prisoner suit"
category. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that, although state habeas
relief had been exhausted, there remained several
other forms of state relief which had not been
tried.j 5 The Eighth Circuit affirmed""6 but the
Supreme Court reversed, stating two alternative
grounds for reversal. The Court was of the opinion
that "Section 2254 does not erect insuperable or
successive barriers to the invocation of federal
habeas corpus." I First, the Court read the exhaustion requirement of section 2254 to mean only
that the state should be given an initial opportunity to correct violations of prisoners' federal rights.
Where the state courts failed to indicate an alternative procedure or had never granted a hearing on
the facts, habeas petitioners need not exhaust all
available remedies." Second, the Court construed
petitioners' allegations as pleading a section 1983
cause of action "for deprivation of constitutional
rights by prison officials," and therefore exhaustion
was unnecessary. n9 The Court concluded by citing
with approval the language of Mr. Justice (then
Judge) Blackmun in Jackson v. Bishop"0 favoring
a flexible approach in treating extraordinary
prisoner suits as section 1983 actions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMJniNDATIONS
A study of the cases indicates that adequate
medical care cannot be systematically provided in
large prisons. This observation is confirmed by
economic and sociological studies. An unpublished
paper by this author, comparing official statistics
of New York's maximum security prisons"' with
'Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 70 (W.D.
Wis. 1971).
= 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
'See
note 115 supra and accompanying text.
12331 F. Supp. 1188 '(1969).
126 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971).
121404 U.S. at 250.
"wI&d
12Id. at 251.
230
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).

" NEw

YoRK Coa -nsSxOOv CoRRTIOxN, ANNUAL

REPoRT 60-61 (1965).
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national figures,'1 indicates that the per capita
amount spent on medical care for all citizens is
from five to eleven times the amount spent on
prisoners, depending on how the figures are interpreted. New York budgeted one half of one per
cent of total prison expenditures for medical care
while Americans spend approximately six per cent
of disposable income after taxes on personal health
care goods and services."' In the less tangible areas
of medical care it has been found that patient involvement and the physician's personal attention
has an influence on the quality of medical care."'
This aspect of medical care is rarely found in
5
maximum security prisons Its absence is understandable in the light of current sociological
85
In human
knowledge about total institutions.
terms the totality and secretiveness of the large
prison produces an iron law of contempt. In the
repressive atmosphere and grinding routine of the
prison, those in authority become hardened to the
basic considerations of humanity expected in our
society. Men who would be friendly, patient, and
considerate without the walls become cold, curt,
and hostile within. Shielded by secrecy they
become calloused to the basic needs of prisoners.
The point is not that the keepers are bad men but
that ordinary men in a bad system cannot be good.
What can be done to remedy these evils? Feasible
solutions lie in three broad areas: political, institutional, and legal.
A. PoliticalSoludions
A political solution, in the form of a radically
altered public attitude to criminal justice in general and prisons in particular, is both the most
important and the least likely to occur." The
figures from New York show that the public, or
" 33 SOCIAL SxcuRiTr BuiuETrn 5 (July 1970).
icAN ME.DicAL AssociAnoN ComassoN
in A
ON THE CosT or MEDICAL CARE, GENEIAL REPORT

9 (1964).
134Id. at 53.
3 A survey of Iowa state prisoners found that over
half of the inmates interviewed or replying to a questionnaire felt that they were not receiving sufficient
medical care, and nearly two-thirds would prefer a
private physician at their own expense. Comment,
The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and
Rights, 53 IOWA L. Rv. 671, 687 (1967).
Prisoners'
,38 See Goffman, Characteristicsof Total Institutions
(1960) reprinted in J. KATZ, J. GorssTmru & A.
DERsnowiTz, PsYCHOANALYSIS, PsYCarATRY AND TEE
LAW, 650-59 (1967).

u7 For one politician's pessimistic view, see the interview of New York Senator Dunne in Attica: A Look
at tIe Causes and tle Future,7 Cain. L. BuLL. 824-28.
(1971) (hereinafter cited as Attica).

those who control the public purse, are not willing
to spend as much on prisoners for medical care as
is spent on the average citizen. Despite the rather
elaborate prison medical facilities that exist in
most states, the principle of "less eligibility"
applies: the condition of the prisoner should not
surpass that of the poorest-off employed citizen."'
If ever there was a fixed rule of a science of penology, this is it. I seriously doubt whether the demand for social welfare on the part of prisoners
will be translated into money and programs in the
forseeable future. Hence, this solution is the most
remote. However, there is something that lawyers
can do in this regard. There is a growing recognition that despite the great moral and symbolic
victories of the prisoners' rights cases which have
assaulted the hands-off doctrine, their actual
impact on the total system is limited."' Sol Rubin
reminds us that the foundation for correctional
work is statutory, and it is there that the greatest
impact can be made. Statutory changes can effectively convert what are now privileges into rights
for the entire prison population, can narrow the
range of discretion where abuses have been frequent, and can motivate rule-making and more
effective administrative control. 14 0
B. InstitutionalSolutions
Any improvement in general prison conditions
is bound to have some impact on the quality of
medical care by reducing overcrowding, moving
facilities closer to big cities and closer to a greater
range of medical talent, and reducing prison populations and the number of people subject to prison
medicine.IU Specific improvements in medical care
are primarily the task of prison administrators and
experts in the delivery of medical services. However, a few general observations can properly be
made here. First, the state of knowledge concerning

13H. BARNEs & N. TEETERs, NEw HoRizoNs IN
CRnnxoLoGy: THE AmERIcAN CRM PROBLEr 962
(1943). One should observe however that Sidney and
Beatrice Webb first applied this principle to paupers
receiving charity.
1 In an interview Professor Herman Schwartz has
remarked, "Tactically, it may be a mistake to press
lawsuits.. .," although it is not his intention to refrain
from
pressing suits. Attica at 823.
40
1 Rubin, Needed-New Legislation in Correction, 17
Cxmx AND DELINQuENCY 392 (1971).
- See generally, R. CL.Aui, Cam IN AMERICA 192218 (1970); N. MoRIs & G. HAwmNs, THE HONEST
PoirrciAN's GuIDE TO CaRzI CONTROL 110-44
(1969).
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prison medicine is poor. The last national survey
of prison medicine was made in 1929."4 Publications since that time display either an unwitting
blindness to the real problems of prison medicine'
or an undue emphasis on exotic medical problems
which do not solve the problem of generally inadequate care.'" The recent interest in delivery of
effective medical care to poor people should also
focus on prison medicine and hopefully lead to
studies which have an impact on improving overall
medical care behind the walls 45
Second, administrative changes may improve
prison medicine by coordinating care efforts
throughout a single prison system. Given the
endemic lack of funds and personnel it is important
to provide services efficiently and economically.
In New York State since September, 1969, the
medical services throughout the system have been
under the control of a Medical Director, who is
also the chief physician of a prison hospital. The
post of medical director within a state's department
of corrections is an unusual administrative feature
and has the potential of making the concerns of
the prison doctor more accessible to the state
prison bureaucracy and assuring minimum levels of
medical care. 14 Other states should study this
approach.
Third, the tenure of prison doctors, dentists, and
nurses should be limited to a fixed period of five
years. The iron law of contempt for inferiors is too
powerful to leave the best-intentioned person
unaffected. There is a real danger that the relatively sheltered position of a prison doctor will
attract those seeking primarily a civil service
sinecure, but there is a greater danger that the long
exercise of power over the powerless will destroy
142F. RECTOR, HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICE IN
AmERcw PRisoNs AND Rx oaRAToums (1929).
' Fuller, Medical Services in CONTEvMoRARY CORRECTION 172 (P. Tappen ed. 1951).
J. PLEASURE, A PILoT PROJECT rOR YOUNG OFTENDERs wIT EPILEPSY (1964); N. Y. DEPARTMENT OF

I"

CORRECTIONS, PLANS TOR THE AGED PRISONER IN THE
YEARs AHEAD (1958); Kurtzberg, Safar & Mandell,

Plastic Surgery in Corrections 33 FED. PROB. 44 (Sept.

1969); Velasco, Woolf & Broadbent, Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery in a State Prison, 66 RocKY MT.
MED. J. 40 (1967); Kurtzberg, Levin, Cavior & Lipton, Psychologic Screening of Inmates Requesting Cosmetic Operations:A PreliminaryReport, 39 PLASTIC &
RxcoNsmucnvE SURGERY 387 (1967).
"4 THomAs, Medical Systems SupvEY (unpublished
report for the New York Department of Correctional
Services, 1971.)
161 would like to thank Dr. James Bradley, New
York State Department of Correction Medical Director, for his time and cooperation.
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those attributes of physicians which are necessary
for quality medical care. 47
C. Legal Solutions

Almost three decades ago the criminologists
Barnes and Teeters surveyed the cruelty of the
modern prison and, with some skepticism, looked
forward to the "New Prison" and "New Penology," which would diagnose and treat that prisoner
rather than punish him.'" Among other things,
the new prison would provide excellent medical
care."' On the other hand, the persistence of the
old prison has been recognized and studied in
detail. 1"' These divergent approaches, the treatment oriented and the custody oriented, have
created ambivalent aims and personnel conflicts
within the prison systems."' Recently, a new
current of thinking has undermined the faith in
rehabilitation held by treatment oriented persons."' The hard-won lesson learned by the most
astute and humane persons concerned with rehabilitation in prisons is that treatment as a
justification for imprisonment is wrong.5" The

great value in this simple but philosophically profound insight is not that treatment efforts should
be abandoned-indeed, they should not-but
rather it enables us to see that prison is punishment
and punishment is privation-an evil, a pain, a
disvalue.M
This means that the constant and effective provision of legal protection and remedies is not a frill
but a necessary aspect of insuring that prisoners
receive basic services. In specific terms this translates into judicial recognition of the substantive
rights of prisoners. For example, a prime cause of
poor medical care in prison is the secret nature of
the institution. When a court holds that a prisoner
has the right to make grievances known to the
7 This suggestion is overly familiar to anyone who
has ever been associated with the Peace Corps. It was
put forward recently by a noted legal writer in a popular

journal, Goldfarb, Why Don't We Tear Down Our Prisons, LooK (July 27, 1971), at 45.
"I H. BARNEs & N. TEETERS, supra note 138, at
646.
4 Id. at 660-62.
"' E. JomsoN, CzraE, CORRECION AND SOcIETY,
515-41 (1964).
" Zald, Power Balance and Staff Conflict in Correctional Institution, in PIsoN WITHIN SocxxY: A
READER IN PENOLOGY 397 (L. Hazelrigg ed. 1968);
TASK FORCE: CORECTIONS, at 47.

1' See, e.g., Rubin, The Concept of Treatment in the
Criminal Law, 21 S. C. L. REV. 3 (1969).
' Id. at 15.
'"4 J. HALL, GENERAL PRINcrPLrs or CRMlNAL LAW
310 (2d ed. 1960).
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public via the news media"'e this has a great, if
indirect, impact on the improvement of prison
medicine. The judicial recognition, enforcement,
and even creation of procedural due process rights
of prisoners has, perhaps, even greater potential."' 6
At present, it is too easy for a legitimate demand
for adequate care to be sidetracked by futile letterwriting to unheeding prison officials, or for custodial personnel to deprive prisoners of medical
care by subverting medical orders.
It is widely recognized, however, that the
present legal machinery is inadequate to handle
the growing volume of prisoners' complaints or to
effectuate across the board improvements. Indeed,
one of the themes running through this paper has
been the importance of effective legal representation to guarantee necessary services, and the
present inability to provide those services. Two
major innovations are the keys to the legal solution. The recent, dramatic involvement of lawyers
1
and law students in prisoners' rights litigation. 5
will create new strains on the courts in the short
run. But this is preferable to the growth of jail
house lawyering and prisoner writ-writing, since it
will ultimately reduce the burden on courts by
screening frivolous complaints, by producing uniform and precise complaints, and by facilitating
informal settlements of grievances where possible.
The second innovation is the creation of independent hearing bodies with power to. investigate
complaints, conduct hearings, inspect facilities and
take corrective actions, if any are required. There
are three models: negotiation, the ombudsman, and
the grievance commission. The negotiation model,
either through regular meetings between prison
s
officials and prisonersin or through prisoners'
unionsln is still in the speculative stage. If such a
model could be implemented on a regular basis, it
MNolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
156See, e.g., Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp.
1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 333
F.Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
1
5See generally Jacob & Sharma, Justice After
Trial: Prisoners'Needs for Legal Services in the Criminal
CorrectionalProcess, 18 KM. L. RPv. 493 (1970).
11N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, at 33, col. 1. A more
radical experiment, democracy, is being tried in Washington: Turner, Democracy is Easingthe Life of Inmates
at Wala Walla Prison, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at
24, col. 1.
,69N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2.

could provide a useful supplement to more formal
means of grievance settlement while getting away
from the abuses inherent when a single prisoner informally tries to make his complaints known to
superiors. The negotiation model, however, would
have to be supplemented by a more formal means
of dispute settlement.
If the ombudsman or grievance commission be
chosen, it is imperative that such a body be independent.10 This is best insured by giving the body
a statutory basis, to give it real power to investigate, and suficient funds for efficient and effective
operation.' A commission or ombudsman should
be guided by formal minimum rules which must be
adhered to,' u but beyond these formal rules there
must lie the ideals which inform our best legal
thinking. In prisoners' rights cases involving medical care the due process clause and the eighth
amendment are most frequently invoked via the
Civil Rights Act. To prisoners, as to most laymen,
basic understanding of these provisions lies in their
ethical correlates: fundamental fairness and human
dignity."' These moral principles have been recognized and implemented by the courts. For an
ombudsman to fail to implement them would be to
destroy the momentum created by legal decisions
in this area. Assuming that the abuses visited on
prisoners will not be terminated solely by appeals
to the goodwill of those who enter prison service, it
is imperative that the legal profession play one of
the leading roles in ending the isolation and
secretiveness of prison life.
160The Philadelphia Prison Society recently announced that the frst "outside" ombudsman (not a
staff person or community agency representative) in
the country had been appointed for Philadelphia's Homesburg Prison. Comancrzozs DiGEsT, Nov. 3, 1971,
at 6. This experiment, however, has foundered when
" the nation's first prison ombudsman, was quietly denied access to the prisons Last month after only three
weeks on the job. The prison board cited 'disqualifying
factors' which it refused to divulge." CoRecTioNs
DIGEsT,
Feb. 9, 1972, at 10.
11
6 See, e.g., Maryland Senate Bill 601 (1971) (to add
new section 204 to MD. ANN. CoDE: art. 41).
'1 See, e.g., First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Resolution of 30 August 1955, Standard Minimum
Rides for the Treatment of Prisoners, ST/SOA/SD/
CG.2/WP.3,
Annex.
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Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1956); see Note,
Revival of the Eighlth Amendment Crud-Punishment
Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STrx. L. Rnv. 996
(1966).

